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CASE NOTE
STANDING ALONE: THE FIGHT TO GET CITIZEN SUITS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
INTO THE COURTS.
A ilor v. City of Maynardvillei
1. INTRODUCTION
Since many illegal acts remain unknown. the government cannot always enforce the laws of this nation.
Perhaps more troubling is the fact that even when these illegal acts are known, the cost of litigation often
prevents the government from taking legal action against every single violator. These grim realities have
special consequences when the environment is concerned. where pollution that goes unpunished can have
serious health implications for people and animals alike. Recognizing that private citizens can be a valuable
asset to the enforcement of environmental laws. Congress passed Section 505 of the Clean Water Act (CWA),
which allows a citizen to bring a lawsuit against anyone "who is alleged to be in violation" of the act.2
However. because the act purports to allow nearly anyone to bring suit, the constitutional doctrines of standing
and mootness are often implicated. The effect is that in reality. courts have interpreted the rules of standing and
mootness in a way that keeps these citizen-suits out of court.
In Ailor v. City of Maynardville. the Sixth Circuit was given an opportunity to interpret the doctrines of
standing and mootness in a way that would not keep viable claims by citizen-plaintiffs out of court.3 In that
case. the court addressed the issue of whether two citizen-plaintiffs had standinf to bring their claims, and if
they did. whether their claims were mooted by a polluter's voluntary cessation. This note explores how the
courts have traditionally handled such cases and argues that, in light of the purpose of citizen-suits and how the
rules of standing and mootness grant courts discretion in their interpretation, tribunals should do what they can
to ensure that citizen suits are heard.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
In the early 1990s. the City of Maynardville ("City") owned and operated a sewage treatment plant
located along Bull Run Creek in Union County, Tennessee.' On occasion, the plant would overflow and
discharge raw sewae into the creek in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit. The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation ("TDEC") began
enforcement proceedings against the City in 1993 because of the plant's repeated violations.7 On November 16,
1993. the Commissioner of the TDEC concluded that the City committed 148 permit violations within a two
year span. After finding that the City had violated two Tennessee statutes, the Commissioner ordered the City
to: (1) initiate a collection system rehabilitation program: (2) submit an Industrial User Survey; (3) bring the
' 368 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2004).
233 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2000).
Ailor, 368 F.3d at 587.





9 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-3-108. -114 (2003).
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plant into compliance with the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and the NPDES permit; and (4) pay a $25,000 civil
penalty to the United States Treasury.' 0
After receiving the Commissioner's order, the City appealed to the Tennessee Water Quality Control
Board ("Board").' After hearings, the Board entered an Agreed Order on July 18, 1995. In an effort to get
the plant into compliance with its NPDES permit, the Agreed Order required the City to submit: (1) a correction
action plan; (2) an engineering report; and (3) plans and specifications for the expansion of the plant.13 The
order also stipulated that the City pay a civil penalty of $1,875 and an additional $16,875 if it failed to comply
with the order.14 After spending 1.7 million dollars to comply with the order. the City's new wastewater
treatment plant went on line in November. 2000.5
On January 30, 1998, while the City was trying to comply with the Board's order. Harry Ailor and Betty
Lynch, landowners downstream from the treatment plant, filed suit against the City in state court for damages
caused by raw sewage overflowing into the creek.' 6 Then, on February 7. 2001., Ailor and Lynch gave the City
notice that they would be filing a lawsuit under the CWA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA")." Subsequently, on Ma 16. 2001. Ailor and Lynch filed a federal court claim under the CWA. the
RCRA, and Tennessee state law.' For relief, the Plaintiffs sought an injunction, compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and litigation costs including reasonable attorney's fees.19
Once the case was in federal court, the City moved for summary judgment. 20 The City argued that
summary judgment should be granted because: (1) the Board's order was complied with; (2) an agency had
already initiated suit against the City; and (3) actions brought under the CWA and the RCRA do not provide for
compensatory or punitive damages.21 In response, the Plaintiffs reiterated their claims but did not offer any
evidence that the City did not comply with the Agreed Order. 22 The Plaintiffs also failed to provide any
evidence that the plant was in violation of its NPDES permit when they filed their claim or when the City made
its motion for summary judgmentn In its reply to the Plaintiffs' response the City asserted that the case was
moot because the new plant had been operating for more than ten months with no discharges in violation of its
NPDES permit.2 4
On November 5, 2001. the district court granted the City summary judgment on the basis that the
Plaintiffs' claim was moot because there was no evidence of overflow since November of 2000, and because
any relief that the Plaintiffs were entitled to under the CWA had been obtained by the State. 2 The court also
dismissed the Plaintiffs' RCRA claims, declined to hear their state law claims. and would not allow them to
recover any attorney's fees.26 One week later. the Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend judgment.27 The




" Id. at 592-93.





22 Id. at 594.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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Plaintiffs argued that the judgment was incorrect for two reasons: (1) the City had admitted to violating its
permit since the new plant went on line; and (2) a manhole overflowed on two separate occasions since
November, 2000.28 The district court denied the motion because it felt the Plaintiffs failed to show good
cause. 29
After their motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied, the Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit
and argued that summary judgment on their CWA claims should not have been granted and that their RCRA
claims were improperly dismissed. 30 The Court of Appeals then affirmed the district court and pointed out that
the Plaintiffs' claims had both standing and mootness problems.3 1 The court found that Plaintiff Ailor lacked
standing because he no longer owned the property in question at the time the federal complaint was filed.32 The
court then held that Lynch may not have had standing to sue because her complaint did not clearly allege that
the City was currently violating its permit.33 The court reasoned that even if Lynch had standing, her claim was
moot because the state had already obtained the remedy that she was entitled to, and the alleged violations were
not likely to recur.34 The court then held that the RCRA claim was properly dismissed because it was similar to
the CWA claim.35
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Water Quality Act and the Clear Water Act
In 1948, Congress enacted the Water Quality Act ("WQA") in response to growing public concern about
the pollution of America's waters.36 Though it was created to greatly curb water pollution, the WQA ultimately
proved to be a failure because it was not restrictive enough. For instance, under the WQA one could still
pollute a body of water if it was large enough to dilute the chemical's dangerous effects.3 8 In addition, instead
of enforcing water quality standards, the WQA primarily provided funding to states to help them develop their
own standards and control programs. 39 In effect, the states were running on the honor system and had a lot of
discretion in deciding how to classify their waters.40
Twenty-four years after the WQA was passed, only half of the states had set water quality standards.4'
Recognizing that the WQA failed to give states any impetus to improve water quality, in 1972 Congress 4assed
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, also known as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The




" Id. at 600.
32 Id. at 597.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 600.
3 Id. at 60 1.
36 Martin A. McCrory, Standing in the Ever-Changing Stream: The Clean Water Act, Article III Standing, and Post-Compliance
Adjudication, 20 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 73, 79 (2001).
3 See id. at 80.
3 Id. at 81.
3 Id. at 79-80.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 80.
42 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
43 McCrory, supra note 36, at 81.
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of water as long as its effects would be diluted, the CWA specifically forbid anyone from polluting navigable
waters except under certain circumstances.44
The CWA claims that its purpose is to restore and maintain the "chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of Nation's waters." 45 One of the most important ways that the CWA attempts to accomplish these
goals is by issuing NPDES permits.46 As previously mentioned, the CWA only allows pollution in certain
circumstances. Since some activities that benefit society necessarily involve water pollution, the CWA
authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to issue NPDES permits.47 These permits allow
48businesses to discharge certain pollutants within express limitations. In order to ensure that a business is in
compliance with its NPDES permit, a permit-holder is required to provide the EPA or a state authority with a
monthly report of its discharges. 49 If a business violates its permit by discharging too much of a pollutant, it
could face civil and criminal penalties.50
B. Citizen Suits
In addition to NPDES permits, another important way that the provisions of the CWA are enforced is
through citizen suits. Under the CWA, a citizen can file a civil action in federal court against "any person ...
who is alleged to be in violation of [their NPDES permit],"51 provided that the citizen gives sixty days notice of
his or her intention to sue to the EPA Administrator, the state, and the violator. 52 In a sense, the citizen suit
provision of the CWA makes individuals "rivate attorneys general" by allowing them to sue businesses and
governmental agencies to enforce the act. However, citizen suits have restrictions on them as well. For
example, a citizen may not bring suit if the EPA Administrator or the state has already done so, nor may he
recover for compensatory or punitive damages. 54 In addition, not all citizens may bring a citizen suit under the
CWA; only a citizen who has an interest that could be affected by the water pollution may bring suit.55
The purpose of the citizen suit provision has been the subject of much debate. Some arve that a citizen
suit can be brought only when the EPA Administrator or the state has failed to take any action. 6 Others would
like these suits to provide redress to the plaintiff for past violations regardless of what governmental action has
been taken.57 However, the Supreme Court answered the question in 1987 when it stated that the "bar on
citizen suits when governmental enforcement action is under way suggests that the citizen suit is meant to
1 33 U.S.C § 1311(a). See also McCrory, supra note 36, at 81.
4
1Id. § 1251(a).
6 See id. § 1342.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. § 1318.
io Id. § 1319. Any person who knowingly violates an NPDES permit is subject to criminal penalties of up to $50,000 per day.. Id. §
1319(c)(2)(B). Any person who violates their NPDES permit is subject to civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation, per day. Id. §
1319(d).
' Id § 1319(a).
52 Id. § 1365(a)-(b).
" Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997).
14 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). Under an action brought pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the CWA, a court may only award
injunctive relief, the assessment of civil penalties to be paid to the U.S. Treasury, and the prevailing party's reasonable attorney's fees.
Id. § 1365(a), (d).
" Id. § 1365(g).
56 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987).
" Id. at 55.
174
MELPR, Vol. 12, No. 2
supplement rather than to supplant governmental action."58 Therefore., the purpose of the citizen suit is to act
when the government fails to.i9
Though the Supreme Court has reduced the citizen suit to a supplementary role, more citizen suits have
been filed under the CWA than any other environmental statute.60 In fact, twice as many CWA suits are filed
by citizens than by state governments and the national government combined.' One author stated:
Citizens have consistently been the predominant mode of CWA enforcement in federal courts
because water violations are usually very apparent. and because citizens who fish, swim, boat, or
hike are the first to notice and report incidents [of water pollution]. [. . .] In truth, if citizens did
not play such a major role in initiating Clean Water Act enforcement actions, there would be
little enforcement, if any.
Therefore. despite being supplemental. the citizen suit has proven to be vital to the success of the CWA.
However, though a citizen may have a right to bring a suit under the CWA, he or she must still satisfy the
constitutional doctrines of standing and mootness.
C. Sianding and Moolness
According to Article Ill of the Constitution, federal courts only have jurisdiction over cases and
controversies . Though nothing in the Constitution speaks of standing or mootness, the Court, in an act ofjudicial restraint. has ruled that it cannot hear claims where the plaintiff has no stake in the litigation. 4 The
concepts of standing and mootness serve to ensure that a plaintiff, had a stake in the suit when the complaint
was filed (standing). and continues to have a stake afterwards (mootness). Thus, if a plaintiff lacks standing or
his claim becomes moot. a federal court may not hear his claim because there is no case or controversy within
the meaning of Article 1Il.65
1. Standing
In order to have standing in a lawsuit. a plaintiff must have a sufficient interest in the dispute. 66 The
Court has determined that a plaintiff has a legally cognizable interest in a suit if he establishes an injury-in-fact,
causation and redressability. .
To have an injury-in-fact. the plaintiff must suffer an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both:(1) concrete and particularized: and (2) actual or imminent.68 In order for an injury to be concrete in a CWA
case, the plaintiff must prove that he has directly suffered because of the defendant's pollution; it is not enough
5 Id. at 60.
59 See id.
60 McCrory. supra note 36. at 76.
" Michael S. Greve. The Private Enforcement of Environmental Lm. 65 TUL. L. REv. 339, 353 (1990).62 McCrory. supra note 36. at 76 n. 12.
63 U.S. CONST. art. Ill. § 2.
6 McCrory, supra note 36, at 86.
65 See id.
66 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.. 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000).67 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555. 560-61 (1992).68 Id. at 560.
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to speculate that the defendant has polluted.69 However, this direct injury does not have to be a physical one; it
may be something such as an aesthetic loss. 70
To establish causation, the plaintiff must prove that there is "a substantial likelihood" that the defendant
caused the plaintiffs harm.7' In a CWA case, the plaintiff can establish this by showing that the defendant: (1)
discharged some pollutant in violation of its NPDES permit; (2) into a waterway in which the plaintiffs have an
interest; and (3) that this pollutant causes the kind of injury that the plaintiff has suffered. If the plaintiffs
harm is not "fairly traceable" to the defendant, then the plaintiff lacks standing.73
The final element of standing is redressability.74 To meet this requirement the plaintiff must show that it
is likely that his or her injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 5 In a citizen suit under the CWA, the
question becomes whether the defendant will stop polluting and thereby injuring the plaintiff if an injunction
and/or civil penalties are ordered. The Supreme Court has ruled that civil penalties redress a plaintiffs injury
even though they are paid to the U.S. Treasury.77 The Court based its decision on the argument that civil
penalties make it likely that a defendant will either stop polluting, or not pollute again in the future.78
Courts have struggled with applying the standing doctrine to citizen suits under the CWA. The CWA
allows a citizen to bring a civil action against "any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of" his or her
NPDES permit.7 9 Though this statement seems simple, it has proven difficult to determine whether Congress
meant that the defendant had to be polluting when the plaintiff filed his complaint or not. Prior to the Supreme
Court case Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation. Inc.. 8 there was a split in the circuits
over this matter.
In the 1985 case Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co. 8 the defendant's pipeline discharged oil
into the plaintiffs' creek.82 Eleven months later, the plaintiffs filed suit.83 The court held that it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs lacked standing.84 In its decision, the Fifth Circuit stated that
"[tihe language of section 1365 and the structure of the [Clean Water] Act convince us that a complaint brought
under section 1365 must allege a violation occurring at the time the complaint is filed."5 The court reasoned
that because the violation occurred eleven months before a complaint was filed, the plaintiffs could not bring
their suit in federal court. 86
The Fourth Circuit, however, handled a similar situation differently just a year later in Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfiled. Ltd.87  In Chesapeake. Gwaltney violated its NPDES permit
6 See Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.. 179 F.3d 107. 113-14 (th Cir. 1999). vacated. 204 F. 3d 149 (4th
Cir. 2000).
70 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63.
71 See Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d at 115.
72 Id.
7 Id.
7 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
7 Id. at 561.
76 McCrory, supra note 36, at I 10.
n Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.. 528 U.S. 167. 185 (2000).
78 See id.
7 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000).
80484 U.S. 49 (1987).
756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
1 Id. at 394.
83 Id.
'4 Id. at 398-99.
85 Id. at 395.86 See id.
87 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
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numerous times.88 Its last violation, however, occurred two weeks before the Chesapeake Bay Foundation filed
a citizen suit in federal court. 89 The Fourth Circuit held that because the EPA could seek civil penalties under
section 309 of the CWA for past violations, section 505(a) of the CWA allowed citizen-plaintiffs to do the
90
same.
When Gwaltney petitioned for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court granted it to resolve the issue of
whether a citizen has standing to sue for past violations.91 The Court held that a citizen suit under the CWA
could only be brought when the defendant was violating its NPDES permit at the time the complaint was filed.92
The Court based its judgment on a number of factors, one being the use of the present tense in the Act. 93 Thus,
the Court concluded, the CWA does not allow citizen suits for "wholly past violations." 94 The Court did make
an exception however, and held that both the CWA and the Constitution would allow a citizen to bring a suit if
he or she made a good faith allegation of an "intermittent violation."95 The Court went on to define an
intermittent violation as one where there is "a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute
in the future."96 Therefore, in order to bring a citizen suit under the CWA and have Article III standing, a
defendant must either be polluting when the complaint is filed, or reasonably likely to pollute again in the
future.97
2. Mootness
Even if a plaintiff establishes standing at the beginning of a lawsuit, his claim can still become moot if
subsequent events deprive him of his stake in the suit.98 In other words, "[t]he requisite personal interest that
must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence
(mootness)."99 If a plaintiff loses his stake, his claim is moot and the court must dismiss it because there is no
"case or controversy" within the meaning of Article 111.100
To get a case dismissed as moot when the plaintiff sues for an injunction, defendants often cease their
unlawful conduct sometime after the complaint is filed. 01 The rationale is that by stopping the conduct, the
plaintiff no longer has a stake in the suit's outcome.102 This is known as the doctrine of voluntary cessation.lo3
The courts have recognized however, that a defendant who stops his unlawful conduct to moot a case can just as
easily "return to his old ways" after the case is dismissed.104 For this reason, a case is only moot by voluntary
cessation when the defendant proves that it is "absolutely clear" the wrongful conduct could not reasonably be
" Id. at 306.
' Id. at 308.
9 Id. at 316-17.
91 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
92 See id. at 59.
9 See id.




9 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997).
9 U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (quoting Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When,
82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973). Note that it has been held that a claim, for damages seldom becomes moot. Chase v. McMasters,
573 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 495-500 (1969)).
'" See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 397.
1t See generally McCrory, supra note 36, at 114-15.
I02 See id.
103 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000).
104 United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
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expected to recur. os If, however, the defendant's cessation is forced by a court or the government, the doctrine
does not apply and the plaintiff s case will be dismissed as moot. 10 6
An issue that has arisen in CWA cases is whether a citizen suit becomes moot when a defendant comes
into compliance with its NPDES permit after the plaintiff has filed his claim.'o7 The Supreme Court has held
that when a citizen files suit solely for an injunction, the case is moot if the defendant-polluter subsequently
complies with its NPDES permit and proves that another violation could not be reasonably expected to recur.108
At one point in time, however, the circuits were split on the issue of whether a citizen's case ever becomes moot
if he is seeking civil penalties. 0 9
In Atlantic States Legal Foundation., Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., the Seventh Circuit held that a
plaintiffs suit for civil penalties does not become moot when the defendant comes into compliance with its
NPDES permit.110 In Atlantic, the defendant discharged pollutants into the Milwaukee sanitary sewerage
system without the proper permits.'" After Atlantic filed suit under the CWA, the defendant obtained the
required permits.'2 The Court held that while a defendant's post-complaint compliance may moot a suit for an
injunction, a citizen can recover civil penalties for any time the defendant was in violation of the law." 3
The Fourth Circuit. however, took the opposite view in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services. 114 In that case, Laidlaw discharged various pollutants in excess of what was allowed
under its NPDES permit."' 5 Friends of the Earth then filed suit against Laidlaw under the CWA seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties.116 After litigation, the district court declined to
grant any declaratory or injunctive relief but ordered Laidlaw to pay $405,800 in civil penalties." 7 Feeling that
this amount was too low, Friends of the Earth appealed to the Fourth Circuit." 8 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
held that a claim for civil penalties alone under the CWA is moot and ordered the district court to dismiss the
action.119 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because civil penalties are paid to the U.S. Treasury and not the
plaintiff. civil penalties cannot redress a plaintiffs injury.120 Therefore, the court held that the case was
moot. 121
The Supreme Court granted Friends of the Earth a writ of certiorari to resolve the split in the circuits. 122
The Court first noted that the Fourth Circuit in Laidlaw had confused the concepts of standing and mootness
and proceeded to analyze redressability as a standing issue. 123 Satisfied that civil penalties do redress a
plaintiffs injury, the Court proceeded to hold that even if a plaintiffs sole claim is for an award civil penalties,
his claim does not automatically become moot if a defendant comes into compliance with its NPDES permit.124
1os Id. (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2nd Cir. 1945)).
..6 See Comfort Lake Ass'n v. Dresel Contracting, Inc.. 138 F.3d 351, 355 (8th Cir. 1998).
107 See general/I McCrory. supra note 36. at 114.
'"s See Gwaltnev. 484 U.S. at 66-67. This is also true whenever the defendant is forced to comply with its NPDES permit. See td.
"'9 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000).
"'See 116 F.3d 814. 820 (7th Cir. 1997).
". Id. at 816.
Id. at 817.
3 Id. at 820.
'1. 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998). rev'd. 528 U.S. 167 (2000)..
"5 Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 176 (2000).
'"' Id. at 177.
'' Id. at 178.




'22 Id. at 179-180.
123 See id. at 180. 708. In its holding, the Court pointed to the deterrent effect that penalties have on polluters. Id. at 185-186.
'2' See id. at 193. The Court noted that this is true even when a district court has ruled that an injunction is unnecessary. Id.
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In its reasoning, the Court argued that an award of civil penalties may deter a polluter from future violations and
therefore the plaintiff still maintains an interest in the lawsuit.12 Thus, where a citizen-plaintiff seeks an
injunction or an award of civil penalties under the CWA, a defendant's voluntary cessation will not moot either
claim unless the defendant proves that its wrongful conduct could not be reasonably expected to recur.126
IV. INSTANT DECISION
After the district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiffs'
motion to alter or amend judgment. the Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit.127 The court of appeals affirmed
the judgment of the district court while anotherjudge concurred in part and dissented in part.1 28
Although the district court ruled that the Plaintiffs' CWA claims and RCRA claims were moot, the Sixth
Circuit quickly pointed out that these claims implicated two distinct justiciability problems: standing and
mootness. 129 The court began its analysis by determining whether both plaintiffs had standing to bring their
CWA claims.' 30 The court first stated that -standing concerns only whether a plaintiff has a viable claim that a
defendant's unlawful conduct 'was occurring at the time the complaint was filed."'"31 The court then narrowed
the issue to whether the City was violating its NPDES permit at the time the Plaintiffs filed their federal
complaint. 32
In deciding this issue. the court quickly concluded that but for the plant's four minor permit violations in
February. March and May of 2001. neither Plaintiff would have standing.133 As to Plaintiff Ailor, the court
found that he "clearly" lacked standing regardless of these minor violations because he did not own the property
in question at the time the federal complaint was filed.134 The court then turned its attention to Lynch. After
looking at the Supreme Court case Giwaliney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,136 the court held that,
in order to establish the "to be in violation" element of standing. a citizen-plaintiff must either allege that the
defendant was violating the CWA at the time the complaint was filed, or make a good faith allegation that it is
reasonably likely that the defendant will violate the CWA again in the future.' 37 In applying Gwaltney to the
facts of the case. the court held that Lynch did not allege that the City was violating the CWA at the time the
complaint was filed because she filed suit several weeks after the plant's last recorded violation.138 The court
also held that Lynch "in essence" lacked standing because she filed suit after the City spent over I million
dollars to comply with its NPDES permit.139 However, the court decided to "give Lynch the benefit of the
25 See id. at 185-186.
26 See id.
127 Ailor v. Cit\ of Maynardville. 368 F.3d 587. 595 (6th Cir. 2004).
1s Id. at 601 -01
2) Id. at 596.
1 0 Id.
1 Id. (quoting NAACP v. City of Panna. 263 F.3d 513. 525 (6th Cir. 2001)). The court went on to note that a plaintiff establishes
standing by demonstrating (1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant's action and (3) is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision. Id.
12 Id.
3 Id. at 596-97.
134 Id. at 597 n.5.
Id. at 597.
36484 U.S. 49 (1987).
1 Ailor, 368 F.3d at 597-99 (citing Gwalnev. 484 U.S. at 57, 64).
18 Id. at 598.
139 Id. at 599.
179
MELPR, Vol. 12, No. 2
doubt" and grant her standing by assuming that her complaint alleged in good-faith that the City would continue
to pollute in the future.140
The Sixth Circuit then turned to the issue of whether Lynch's CWA claim was moot.141 The court noted
that a case is moot when, after the filing of a lawsuit, events deprive a plaintiff of his or her legal "interest in the
outcome of the litigation."l 42 The court then stated that a party is deprived of his legal interest when a
defendant voluntarily stops the offending conduct and carries the "heavy burden" of "mak[ing] it absolutely
clear that" the conduct "could not be reasonably expected to recur." 143 In its analysis of this rule, the court
agreed with the district court's finding that Lynch no longer had a legal interest in the case because no overflow
into Bull Run Creek had occurred since the new plant opened in November, 2000.'14 In addition, the court held
that the City had met its "heavy burden" by presenting undisputed evidence that, at the time summary judgment
was granted, the City was in compliance with its NPDES permit and that any alleged violations were largely
due to the old wastewater plant. 45 The court further reasoned that the Plaintiffs. as a nonmoving party
opposing a summary judgment motion, had their chance to prove that their case was not moot, but failed to
offer any evidence that the plant was likely to overflow into Bull Run Creek again.146 The court then held that
the Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney's fees because they never had a valid claim under the CWA.44 The
court also ruled that the Plaintiffs' RCRA claims were properly dismissed because they were substantially
similar to the CWA claims.' 48
In a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Cole agreed with the majority that
Ailor lacked standing, but he felt Lynch's claim was not moot and that she was entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees.149 Cole stated that a genuine issue of material fact still existed because the City failed to make it
"absolutely clear" that its alleged violations would not recur. 50 He then noted that though the City improved its
wastewater treatment plant, its improvement fell short of the required "absolutely clear" standard. and that there
was evidence that the violations would continue.1'
V. COMMENT
Citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes are designed to encourage enforcement of those
statutes, making citizen-plaintiffs "private attorneys general."1 2 As mentioned previously, more citizen suits
have been filed under the CWA than any other environmental statute. l53 and twice as many CWA suits are filed
by citizens than by the government. 1 These statistics show the importance of citizen suits and that perhaps,
without them. there would be little if any enforcement of the CWA.' This is because citizens. not
140 Id.
I41 Id.
142 Id. at 596.
'4 Id. at 595-96 (citing Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.. 528 U.S. 167. 180 (2000) (internal citation omitted)).
'4 Id. at 599.
4 Id. at 599-600.
146 Id. at 600.
'17 Id. at 601.
14 Id.




152 See Bennett v. Spear., 520 U.S. 154. 165 (1997).
1 McCrory. supra note 36. at 76.
Greve, supra note 61.
1s5 McCrory, supra note 36. at 76.
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governments, feel the practical effects of water pollution such as having to think twice about whether to go
fishing or swimming.
If citizen suits are so vital to the success and the enforcement of the CWA, why do courts seem to apply
the doctrines of standing and mootness in a way that keeps these important cases from being heard? For
instance, in Ailor, though the Plaintiffs estimated that their property damage from the water pollution amounted
to $750,000, the court held that Plaintiff Ailor "clearly" lacked standingl 56 and that Plaintiff Lynch "in essence"
lacked standing.'57 Even assuming that the $750,000 number is exaggerated, it is difficult to imagine how a
plaintiff can incur hundreds of thousands of dollars of property damage and still lack a legally cognizable
interest in a CWA claim. Can we have the best of both worlds? That is, can the courts allow these kinds of
suits tobe heard and still be true to the constitutional doctrines of standing and mootness?
The answer is yes. In fact, the rules of standing and mootness themselves provide courts with some
leeway in their application. In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the Supreme Court
held that a citizen has Article III standing to bring suit under the CWA if the defendant is polluting when the
complaint is filed. 5 8 However, the Court also held that a citizen has standing if he or she has made a good faith
allegation of an "intermittent violation." That is, if there is "a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will
continue to pollute in the future."' 59 Thus, in order for a citizen to have standing in a CWA suit, the court
merely has to find that the plaintiff has alleged that it is likely that the defendant will pollute again in the
future.16 0 As the rule is phrased, it seems that courts have a lot of discretion in determining whether a plaintiff
has made such an allegation. For instance, in a case where a pleading does not make it entirely clear whether a
plaintiff has much such an allegation, a court has enough flexibility with the ambiguous language to find
standing or not.
An equal amount of discretion is also available to a court in analyzing whether a claim is moot by a
defendant's voluntary cessation. In Gwaltney, the Court stated that when a defendant seeks to have a case
dismissed as moot because he has ceased his wrongful conduct, he carries the "heavy burden" of proving that it
is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur."1 61 No
doubt the key term in this rule is the phrase "absolutely clear." 62 However, "absolutely clear" is a vague
standard. While there has been little guidance on the subject, perhaps the words "absolutely clear" were
intended to be ambiguous in order to allow courts some freedom of interpretation. Therefore, just as it appears
that courts have discretion in determining whether an "intermittent violation" has been alleged by a citizen-
plaintiff, it also appears that courts have some discretion in determining whether a defendant has made it
"absolutely clear" that his wrongful behavior won't recur. If the CWA citizen suit provision is intended to
allow citizens to enforce the act, courts should construe a complaint liberally to find that a plaintiff has alleged
an "intermittent violation" in order to find standing and should strictly require that the defendant has made it
"absolutely clear" that he will not pollute again so a plaintiff s claim will not become moot.163
In Ailor v. City of Maynardville,164 the Sixth Circuit had an opportunity to make sure that the doctrines
of standing and mootness would be applied in citizen-friendly way. In regards to standing, the court was true to
the spirit of a citizen suit. For instance, the court found that Plaintiff Lynch had standing by giving her "the
benefit of the doubt" and liberally interpreting the complaint in such a way as to find that she had alleged
156 Ailor, 368 F.3d at 597 n.5.
' Id. at 598.
158See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987).
1 Id.
'6See id.
161 Id. at 66 (quoting United States v. Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
162 Id.
163 Id.
6 368 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2004).
181
MELPR, Vol. 12, No. 2
intermittent violations.' 65 When the court addressed the mootness issue, however, it was not as citizen-friendly.
Though the court had just granted Lynch standing, it then turned around and mooted her case by finding that the
City had met its "heavy burden" of making it absolutely clear that its wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur.166 As the dissenting judge pointed out, the court had found it was "absolutely clear" that City
the would not repeat its conduct despite three pieces of evidence: 1) the fact that the City itself had admitted
concerns about its "collection system rehabilitation program;" 2) the fact that the City had produced a recent
report that warned of increased sewage flows; and 3) the fact that the City had been in chronic violation of
NPDES permit for years.16 7 Thus, just as the dissenting judge reasoned, the court could have just as easily
interpreted the "absolutely clear" standard more strictly to find that Lynch's claim was not moot. 168
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the courts have a responsibility to uphold the constitutional doctrines of standing
and mootness; these doctrines cannot be disregarded without violating Article III's "case or controversy"
requirement. However, if the citizen-suit provision of the CWA is intended to encourage citizens to enforce the
act, the courts also have a responsibility to respect Congress' intent by doing what they can to get these claims
into the courts. As the rules stand now, the courts can do two things without compromising standing and
mootness: 1) the courts can liberally construe a complaint to find that a plaintiff has alleged an "intermittent
violation;'" and 2) the courts can strictly interpret the requirement that the defendant has made it "absolutely
clear" that his conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur. If these two things are done, we can have the
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COURT REPORTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
BedRoc Ltd.. v. United States. 541 U.S. 176 (2004).
The United States Supreme Court held that sand and gravel were not "valuable minerals" reserved for
the government under the Pitman Underground Water Act of 1919.
BedRoc Limited, LLC. and Western Elite, Inc. filed an action to quiet title to the sand and gravel on 560
acres of land north of Las Vegas. Nevada. Originally owned by the United States, this land was patented in the
1940's under the Pitman Underground Water Act of 1919. BedRoc's action was filed in response to the Bureau
of Land Managements interpretation of the Pitman Act's reservation of "valuable minerals" as including
substances such as sand and gravel. The BLM based its decision primarily on Supreme Court precedence,
which held that gravel was a mineral reserved to the United States under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of
1916. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. On appeal with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court affirmed., relying primarily on the Act's legislative
history and Supreme Court precedence.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, with the plurality holding that
sand and gravel are not valuable minerals as contemplated by the Pittman Act. This decision was based
primarily on the modifier "valuable" twice applied to the word mineral in the Pittman Act. The plurality's
textual approach found that the modifier -valuable" created a narrower reservation of minerals for the United
States than the reservation examined in previous cases. As such, the Court was able to refrain from overruling
its previous decision. while providing an outcome largely in opposition to its past reasoning. The dissent noted
that the pluralitvs decision was in direct conflict with the legislative history of the Pittman Act, and that the
holding served only to create ambiguity. The plurality responded that the unambiguousness of the statutory
language made resorting to legislative history unnecessary.
JAY D. HASTINGS
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004)
In a case that created strange bedfellows, various environmental groups and the Teamsters banded
together to prevent Mexican truck carriers from entering the United States. They objected to the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration*s (FMCSA) failure to do an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the effect
of its new regulations pertaining to Mexican carriers. The FMSCA, a division of the Department of
Transportation. was charged with promulgating new regulations after a moratorium banning Mexican Truck
Carriers was lifted. The ban had been in effect since 1982 when Congress placed a two-year moratorium on the
certification of truck carriers domiciled in Mexico and Canada over concern about unfair treatment of American
truck carriers. Congress gave the President the power to extend the moratorium if he determined that doing so
would be in the national interest. Although the Canadian moratorium was allowed to expire after the allotted
two-year period, the blanket denial of Mexican certification remained in effect indefinitely. In 1992, the leaders
of the United States. Mexico and Canada signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As part
of the agreement, the United States agreed to slowly phase out the moratorium on Mexican truck carrier
certification by January 2000. The President did begin to allow some licensing for Mexican bus carriers, but the
majority of Mexican carriers still could not receive certification by the time the January 2000 deadline passed.
Mexico brought an action under the provisions of NAFTA in order to have the moratorium lifted. An
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international arbitration panel found that the United States was in violation of the treaty and compelled the
United States to comply.
In November 2002, the moratorium was lifted. Shortly before the ban was lifted, plaintiffs petitioned
for judicial review of the new FMSCA regulations asserting that they violated both NEPA and the Clean Air
Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioners and set aside the rules. The appellate court
found that the FMCSA had not given adequate consideration to the environmental effects of lifting the
moratorium. In fact, the FMSCA had promulgated regulations as if the moratorium was to remain in effect.
Since it was foreseeable that the President was going to rescind the moratorium, the Ninth Circuit held that the
FMSCA should have taken this into account.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's analysis. It held that the petitioners made no
showing that the FMCSA's decision not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious. and. as such, the
regulations must be upheld. The petitioners argued that the FMCSA's reasoning was flawed because it did not
take into account the lifting of the moratorium. The Court quickly rejected this argument. ruling that the
FMCSA had no control over the moratorium and it could not be expected to take it into account for the purpose
of complying with NEPA. The court focused on the fact that it was the President's decision to lift the
Moratorium, and that FMSCA had no control over whether or not Mexican trucks would enter the United
States. The FMSCA was merely charged with developing a regulatory scheme, not with assessing the
environmental effects of trucks entering the country. The Court did not clarify whose shoulders that
responsibility would fall on, or if this holding scaled back the EIS requirement under NEPA.
JON MORROW
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004)
In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether
the authority of a federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA'") to compel agency action that is
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed extends to planning documents of the Bureau of Land
Management. The Supreme Court held that that land use plans are not legally binding commitments
enforceable under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
The Bureau of Land Management created land use plans for the San Rafael area and the Henry
Mountains area in Utah. San Rafael and Henry Mountains are included in 2 million acres of Utah that were
recommended for wilderness designation. These two areas are open to off-road vehicles which allegedly caused
negative environmental consequences such as soil erosion and compaction. harassment of animals. and
annoyance of wilderness lovers.
Due to these environmental concerns. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance filed an action in the District
Court of Utah against the Bureau of Land Management. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance believed the
Bureau: (1) failed to act pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, which states that lands
should be managed in such a manner as not to impair its suitability for preservation as wilderness until Congress
acts upon the recommendation; (2) failed to implement provisions regarding ORV use in the land use plans; and
(3) failed to take a "hard look"" pursuant to the NEPA. at whether it should perform supplemental environmental
analysis for areas with ORV use. In order to remedy these failures Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance sued
pursuant to the APA provision providing a cause of action to -compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed."
The District Court dismissed all three claims. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals with a divided panel
reversed. The court concluded that the Bureau's non-impairment obligation is a mandatory and
nondiscretionary duty, and, thus. the Bureau could be compelled to comply. Using similar reasoning, the Tenth
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Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the land use plan claim and the NEPA claim. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case.
According to the Supreme Court, it was unnecessary to consider whether the action envisioned by the
land use plan was sufficiently discrete to be compelled under the APA. As to the NEPA claim the Supreme
Court found no ongoing "major Federal action" requiring supplementation. In reversing the judgment, the
Supreme Court held that the Bureau's statement to conduct "use supervision and monitoring" in designated
areas in the Henry Mountains area land use plan were not a legally binding commitment enforceable under the
APA.
LAURIE KNIGHT
UNITED STATS COURT OF APPEALS
Morris v. United.States, 392 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Robert E. Morris and Carol L. Morris ("plaintiffs") brought suit against the United States alleging that
the regulatory provisions of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") constituted a taking compensable under the
Fifth Amendment.
In 1995, the plaintiffs purchased a half-acre lot adjacent to the Eel River in Humboldt County,
California. After several years, the plaintiffs wanted to harvest six large old-growth redwood trees growing on
the property. In compliance with the ESA, the plaintiffs contacted the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") to determine whether harvesting the trees would violate the ESA by interfering with the behavioral
patterns of fish in the Eel River. After visiting the plaintiffs' property, the NMFS determined that the plaintiffs
needed to obtain an Incidental Take Permit ("ITP") before harvesting the trees. This permit allows the "taking"
of certain listed species if such taking is incidental to an otherwise lawful activity. The plaintiffs investigated
the costs of filing the application, but concluded that the costs (allegedly over $10,000) were greater than the
value of the trees, or their property (purchased for $2,500).
The United States moved to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs' claim was unripe because they had
never applied for an ITP, and consequently, the government never took a final action restricting the use of the
property. The Court of Federal Claims agreed, holding that the plaintiffs must at least make an application for
an ITP before their claim can ripen.
On appeal, the plaintiffs' argued that their claim was ripe for review because the cost of the permitting
process was greater than the value of their property. The plaintiffs' also conditionally challenged the Court of
Federal Claims' decision on procedural grounds. They argued that if the Court of Federal Claims dismissed
their claim on the premise that their allegations of the cost of the permitting process were inaccurate, the court
erred because it was required to accept their factual allegations as true. In response, the United States argued
that the plaintiffs' claim was unripe because the plaintiffs made no attempt to use the available permitting
procedure. With respect to the plaintiffs" conditional claim, the United States argued that the condition was not
met because the plaintiffs' claim was dismissed for not filing an application, not because the court disbelieved
the plaintiffs' allegations concerning the cost of the application. Finally, the United States argued that even if
the court had decided the case on the grounds the plaintiffs suggested, the decision was proper because the court
was not bound to accept all of the allegations in the complaint as true, and the court could have look beyond the
pleadings to determine whether it had jurisdiction.
In determining whether the plaintiffs claim was ripe, the Federal Circuit addressed the plaintiffs' claim
that the ITP permitting process would cost over $10,000. The court found that it was incorrect for the plaintiffs
to assume that this cost was either fixed or knowable because the plaintiffs were not taking into account the
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agency's discretion in assisting the plaintiffs in the application process. The court noted that the plaintiffs' own
counsel had conceded that the agency had discretion in determining what steps the plaintiffs needed to take.
The court ultimately held that because the plaintiffs had not allowed NMFS to exercise its discretion, or to make
a final agency decision, their claim was not ripe as a matter of law.
LINDSAY COUNTE
Carus Chemical Co. v. EPA, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 389 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
Carus Chemical Company ("Carus") sought review of the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
decision to place a site partially located on Carus' property on the National Priorities List ("NPL"). The NPL is
a list of hazardous waste sites that need priority cleanup. The Carus property was used as a smelter and rolling
mill for more than a hundred years before Carus purchased the property. During that time period, slag piles
accumulated on the property and in the adjacent Little Vermillion River. The Environmental Protection Agency
believed the slag piles were a threat to human health.
Under CERCLA, the EPA must compile a list of priority sites for hazardous cleanup throughout the
country. To help determine which sites qualify for the NPL, the EPA developed the Hazard Ranking System
("HRS"). First, the EPA uses the HRS to identify the source of contamination at a site, the hazardous
substances generally associated with the source, and the possible pathways threatened by the hazardous
substance. There are four possible pathways for each site to be evaluated: (1) soil exposure; (2) air migration;(3) ground water migration; and (4) surface water migration, the relevant pathway in this case. After evaluating
the hazardous substances located at the site, the EPA calculates a threat score for the threatened pathway. Any
site with a total score over 28.5 is eligible for the NPL.
Following the method set forth in the HRS, the EPA scored the surface water migration of the Carus
site. The EPA discovered various hazardous substances at the site, including: cadmium, copper, lead, nickel,
and zinc. To determine the toxicity factor for the cadmium, the EPA used the toxicity factor value
corresponding with exposure through inhalation (rather than ingestion), even though inhalation was unlikely to
occur at the site. Using this method of exposure, the EPA valued the total toxicity score of the site at 50. The
court found the EPA's evaluation of the site was proper because the EPA consistently uses the highest toxicity
value when calculating a total threat score.
After finding the EPA's scoring appropriate, the court addressed Carus' claim that the EPA relied on
outdated data to determine the toxicity value. Carus argued that the data collected at the site in 1991 and 1993
was outdated and more recent samples show that the EPA incorrectly listed the site. However, the EPA
reviewed the more recent samples and found the samples consistent with the total score of the site. Carus
further argued that the slag piles were highly resistant to further leaching, there were other remedial alternatives,
and that the EPA overstated the environmental and health risks posed by the site.
The court found that Carus Chemical Company failed to show that the EPA incorrectly determined the
toxicity score of the site. and that the EPA relied on outdated information in reaching its decision to list the site
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Horn Farms v. Hohanns, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1639 (7th Cir.)
16 U.S.C. §3812-24 was enacted in 1985. This statute was dubbed the "Swampbuster" because under
the statute farmers who converted wetlands lost federal subsidies. The loss was proportional to the amount of
wetland converted for agricultural use. In 1990. an amendment prevented federal agricultural subsidies from
going to any farmer who converted wetlands. In 1996. an additional amendment was passed which added an
exception for wetlands that had previously been drained and farmed, had reverted to wetland status, and then
were restored to agricultural use.
In 1998 Horn Farms drained around 6.2 acres of wetlands which had previously been drained and
converted to farm use. Although the date of the first conversion from a wetland to a farm cannot be determined
exactly. Horn Farms concedes it was prior to December 23. 1985. Horn Farms was ineligible for the 1996
exception and lost all federal subsidies because the Department of Agriculture interpreted "after that date" to
refer to December 23. 1985.
Horn Farms. however, argued they should not lose federal subsidies because "that date" means the date
of the original conversion. They argue any wetland converted to farm use before December 23, 1985 can be
farmed again without loss of federal subsidy regardless of its status on December 23, 2005. The federal district
court agreed and directed the Department to resume subsidy payments.
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's ruling regarding subsidy payments. The
Seventh Circuit found that the Secretary's interpretation of "that date" as December 1985 is the most sensible
and is reasonable. December 1985 is the proper interpretation because December 23, 1985 is the last antecedent
of -that date." the date on which a wetland was "previously identified" is meaningless for land converted prior
to December 1985 when the approach to identifying wetlands came into existence. Further, the date of the
original conversion is implausible because such an interpretation would make much of the remaining language
functionless. Additionally. the Seventh Circuit held the interpretation is proper because if "that date" was
interpreted as the time of original conversion the legislation would allow a reduction of wetlands following the
enactment and would allow them in ways that would be difficult to police.
Finally. the district court stated the legislation offends the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed. and noted that the district court should not have ruled on the statute's
constitutionality. and. further. the district court's constitutional analysis lacked the force precedence.
ANNE E. KERN
Heartwood. Inc. v. U. S. Forest Service. 380 F.23d 428 (8th Cir. 2004)
Heartwood. Inc. filed suit against the United States Forest Service ("USFS") and the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service ("FWS") over the approval of the Eastwood II Project. This project involved plans to
harvest timber from several sites in the Mark Twain National Forest. At the heart of the controversy was the
protection of the endangered Indiana bat. which resides in parts of the Mark Twain National Forest. The USFS
prepared an environmental assessment of the project. After making a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI) with regard to the Eastwood II project, the agency did not prepare an environmental impact statement.
The USFS also consulted with the FWS concerning the project's impact on the endangered Indiana bat. Both
agencies concluded in August 2001 that the impact of the project would not jeopardize the existence of the
Indiana bat.
The district court in this case granted summary judgment for the USFS and the FWS. Heartwood
appealed to the Eighth Circuit. It argued the USFS had violated the National Environmental Policy Act("NEPA") because it failed to issue an environmental impact statement for the Eastwood II project. Heartwood
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also argued the agency had violated the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") by not considering the best scientific
data available. Heartwood believed further study of the area was required because endangered Indiana bats had
been found near the project area in May of 2004.
The Eighth Circuit held that the USFS of failing to issue an environmental impact statement was not
arbitrary and capricious. The court found that the USFS had taken a hard look at the Eastwood II project and its
potential impacts by considering several factors including whether the project was highly controversial, the
unique characteristics of the project area, and the effect the project would have on endangered or threatened
species in the area. Thus, the findings of the USFS supported the FONSI, and no environmental impact
statement was required. The court also found that the length of the environmental assessment did not determine
whether an environmental impact statement was necessary. Heartwood argued that a Council on Environmental
Quality document supported the idea that an environmental assessment longer than fifteen pages signaled an
environmental impact statement should be filed. The court pointed out this document was not a regulation and
therefore was not binding on the court.
The Eighth Circuit also held the USFS was not arbitrary and capricious with regard to ESA. Heartwood
argued the USFS violated ESA by not using the best scientific and commercial data available. Heartwood
argued that more surveys of the project area were necessary due to the discovery of an Indiana bat colony in
May 2004. The court determined that the best scientific data requirement did not mean that an agency had to
conduct new surveys or tests. The rule, as read by the court, required the USFS to consider all existing
information available that was relevant to the project. However, the court noted that if more information should
become available about the Indiana bat the USFS would be required to reevaluate its findings and possibly
adjust the project.
MARISSA L. TODD
United States v. Templeton, 378 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2004).
From 1998 to 1999. Rush Templeton leased and operated a restaurant and bar known as The Tavern.
The Tavern was located at Venetian Harbor. Inc. (VHI), a marina on the Mississippi River near Portage Des
Sioux, Missouri. The tavern itself sat on a 166-foot towboat, the Frank C. Rand (Rand). which was moored at
VHI. The towboat was purchased and repaired by VHI and moored approximately fifteen feet from the shore,
secured by two poles and attached by eighteen removable bolts. The barge's radar and smokes stacks were
intact, but the Rand's engines were inoperable. Numerous alterations to the Rand were made, including the
addition of a new sewage system which used the barge's old air tanks as sewage tanks. While two waste
discharge pipes allowed licensed waste haulers to pump out waste from the Rand and restaurant. waste from the
barge was routinely discharged into the river between one to three times per week.
In the Fall of 1999, Special Agent Andrew McFarlane of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) began an investigation of alleged dumping from the Rand. The investigation resulted in
indictments under the Clean Water Act (CWA) for knowingly discharging pollutants and for conspiring to
discharge pollutants illegally. Templeton was convicted following a jury trial before the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
On appeal, the key issue was the term -vessel" as used in the CWA. The Eighth Circuit found the Rand
to be a towable vessel capable of use and not subject to the criminal penalties under the CWA, and therefore,
reversed the convictions. Sewage from "vessels" does not qualify as a pollutant under the CWA. and the Eighth
Circuit applied the traditionally broad definition of "vessel." Several circuits have examined the term -vessel"
in respect to legislation such as the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). The court
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noted how the First, Second, and primarily the Fifth Circuit, have followed the traditionally broad definition, the
"capable of use" definition.
Despite being moored to the shore, and only being incapable of transporting anyone or anything over the
water, except via towing, the Eighth Circuit relied on this expansive definition to reverse the convictions. The
court held that any residual capacity, no matter how inefficient, expensive, or impractical was enough to define
the Rand as a "vessel," and any waste from The Tavern falls under the "vessel" exception.
JOHN R. GRIFFITH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
St. Bernard Citizens for Environmental Quality. Inc. v. Chalmatte Refining, L.L.C.. 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1605
(E.D. La. 2005)
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana had before it a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of standing for two nonprofit environmental organizations suing a local refinery
pursuant to the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), and the Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b)(1).
The St. Bernard Citizens group was established in part to protect "the organization's members and other
St. Bernard Parish residents from pollution coming from the surrounding petrochemical industry." Similarly,
the Louisiana Bucket Brigade stated that one of its purposes was to address "environmental health and justice
issues in Louisiana." The interests sought to be protected are thus, directly related to the organizational
purpose. In this case, neither monetary damages nor relief limited to a single person nor group was sought,
individual members of the organizations were not required to participate.
Plaintiffs submitted affidavits of their members demonstrating that odors, petroleum deposits and the
constant presence of soot on their property, coming from Chalmette, had prevented the enjoyment of their
property, forced them indoors and caused a health concerns. Plaintiffs asserted that the smells came when the
wind blew from Chalmette's direction, which they had been told such by Chalmette personnel, that their
observations were supported by EPA determinations and that Chalmette had 34 previous emissions violations.
Although Chalmette argued that the plaintiffs had to show that there was no other source to demonstrate that
their injury was fairly traceable, the court held that a "substantial likelihood" was all that was required. As to
redressability, plaintiffs sought injunctive and civil penalty remedies which they claim can prevent the
recurrence of the repeated injury and unless such remedies are granted, a "there is a real threat that such
violations will continue to occur." Thus, the court reasoned that injunctive relief as well as civil penalties are
appropriate to redress the injuries by encouraging Chalmette to discontinue the current violations and ensure
they do not recur.
As such, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment based on the un-contradicted
assertions of the plaintiffs in addition to un-rebutted evidence by Chalmette.
JOSHUA N. CORMAN
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STATE COURTS
Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 2004)
Joseph and Linda Gacke have resided on their farmstead since 1974. In 1996, Pork Xtra, L.L.C. ("Pork
Xtra") built two hog confinement buildings across the road about 1300 feet north of the Gacke's home. As a
result of these hog confinement facilities, the Gacke's endured offensive odors that caused breathing difficulties
for the Gacke's and their visitors.
The Gackes filed a nuisance suit against Pork Xtra on June 13, 2000, claiming diminution of their
property value and emotional distress. Pork Xtra an affirmative defense under Iowa Code section 657.11(2),
which gives nuisance immunity to animal feeding operations. The trial court found this provision to be an
unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation, and, as a result, rendered judgment in
favor of the Gackes. The trial court awarded the Gacke's damages for the decreased value of their property, and
for personal damages caused by Pork Xtra's hog confinement facilities.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the nuisance immunity provision as unconstitutional,
finding it violated two sections of the Iowa Constitution. The court held that section 657.11 "deprive[d]
property owners of a remedy for the taking of their property resulting from a nuisance created by an animal
feeding operation," and was an unreasonable exercise of police power. Furthermore, the court found that Pork
Xtra's hog confinement facilities significantly impaired the Gacke's use and enjoyment of their property. Id. at
171. If Pork Xtra were granted nuisance immunity the Gackes would have no remedy against damages already
incurred.
The court stated that in order to be consistent with legislative intent, limited effect could be given to
section 657.11(2). Doing so applies the statute in a way that does not constitute an unconstitutional taking
without just compensation. In creating nuisance immunity for hog confinement facilities, the legislature
"sought 'to protect and preserve animal agricultural production operations' in Iowa by sheltering them from the
costs of nuisance lawsuits." Id. at 175. This intent is still effectuated by limiting nuisance immunity, and only
requiring animal operations to pay for the "easement" created from the nuisance. As a result, the economic
burdens of nuisance suits brought against animal operators are lessened, which materializes the legislature's
intent. Although the court found this statute unconstitutional, it reversed because of prejudicial error at the trial
court level resulting from the admission of certain hearsay evidence.
HALEY PEERSON
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